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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALBERT J. CASTAGNO and
BERNICE B. CASTAGNO, his
wife,
Plaintiff-Respondants,
Case No. 14412

-vsMELVIN CHURCH and ESTHER
C. CHURCH, his wife,
Defendant-Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS CHURCH

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for Breach of Contract arising out
of a Uniform Real Estate Contract which included the sale—
purchase of water rights with Defendants-Appellants as the
sellers, and Plaintiffs-Respondents as buyers.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court.

From a judgment in

favor of the Plaintiffs, on their cause of action, Defendants
appeal.

-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment as to Plaintiffs'
cause of action, and entry of judgment in their favor as a matter of
equity, or that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants had aquired a water right known as "the
Buzianis right" (T. 40, Lines 18-24), which they sought to
transfer to a well upon the subject property prior to the
execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which Plaintiffs
and Defendants subsequently executed.

However, Defendants were

prevented from transferring the point of diversion to the well
because the right was in one water district and the well was
in another.

(T. 39, Lines 30 - 40, Line 10).

Thereafter, both parties had discussion with Rex Larson,
the area engineer of the State Engineer's Office, Water Rights
Division, about another right they could possibly transfer to
the subject well.

(T. 44, Lines 6 - 12 & T. 40, Lines 25-30).

The parties thereafter obtained an assignment of this right.
(The Castagno or Bernard Castagno right), (T. 56, Lines 5-6,
20-30, & T. 57, Lines 1-10).

Bernard Castagno was the father

of Plaintiff, Albert Castagno.

His mother assigned the right,

which represented five second feet of water to the Plaintiff,
Albert Castagno, who assigned three second feet thereof to the
Defendant, Melvin Church.
of 1973.

These assignment were made in August

(T. 90, Lines 8-30 & T. 91, Lines 1-12). Thereafter,
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in December, 197 3, the parties executed the Uniform Real Estate
Contract, out of which the controversy herein arises.
T. 5, Lines 4-8) . The
attorney.

(Ex, 1-P,

contract was drafted by the Plaintiffs'

(T. 84, Lines 8-12).

Attached to the contract was a sheet entitled, "Exhibit
A", which Plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Watson, indicated at trial
was prepared by him.

(T. 92, Lines 1-19).

Paragraph three of

Exhibit A provided as follows:
"Upon payment in full of said contract price,
Sellers will convey by Warranty Deed the
final easterly contiguous Ten (10) acres of
said property, together with all water rights
to Well already drilled upon said property,
Well Certificate #
_[sic], including Two
[sic] second feet of water, one second foot of
which Buyer will furnish..."
After the execution of the contract, Plaintiffs entered
into possession of the premises and commenced pumping the subject well to irrigate a crop of barley.
Shortly after having so commenced, however, Mr. Larson
ordered the well to be shut off, (T. 38, Lines 14-18), because
there was a "question" about the title to the water right. (T.55,
Lines 6-7).
Defendants then sought a hearing through the Division
of Water Rights to clear the protests to the water rights,
(T. 55, Lines 28-30), and on the day the hearing was scheduled,
Defendant, Melvin Church went to the Plaintiffs' attorney's office
to assist in preparing for the hearing.

(T. 98, Lines 5-6, 14-23),

but the hearing was continued and not held.

(T. 58, Lines 1-16?

T. 97, Lines 16-21? T. 98, Lines 24-29 & T. 99, Lines 1-13);
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nor has the hearing since been held to approve or deny the
transfer to the subject well,

(T. 58, Lines 14-21); although,

Rex Larson admitted that the hearing should have been set
automatically by the State Engineer, and not at the request
of the parties,

(T. 61, Lines 7-11).

Consequently, although Defendants have segregated to
the subject well one second foot of the three second feet
assigned to them by the Plaintiffs, (T. 90, Lines 8-16 & 30;
T. 91, Lines 1-12), Defendants have not been able to comply
with their agreement.

And, according to Rex Larson, the area

engineer, there are no other water rights for sale in the area;
the area is closed to new appropriations.

(T. 46, Lines 5-30;

T. 47, Lines 1-4).
Therefore, when Plaintiffs- tendered full payment and
demanded one second foot of water or a reduction in the price
of the land, Defendants were frustrated by events beyond their
control, or the

foreseeability of the parties when the contract

was executed, and thereby unable to perform.

The Court erred

in granting judgment in spite of Defendants1 impossibility of
performance.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE CONTRACT IS AMBIGOUS AS TO THE
WATER RIGHTS INTENDED TO BE CONVEYED.
.

Paragraph two of the Contract (Ex. 1-P), and paragraph

three of the attachment thereto, labled "Exhibit

A ", contain

provisions for the conveyance by the sellers to the buyers of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
A Machine-generated- OCR,
may contain errors.

a second foot of water.

Yet in both instances, a blank is

left in the typewritten paragraph for the identifying number
of the "certificate" by which the second foot of water is to
be identified.
Even a cursory reading of paragraph three of the attachment would indicate that the parties had in mind a distinct
particular

and

water right when the contract was executed.

The sentence in question reads in part as follows, (Ex.
1-P) :
"...Sellers will convey...all water

to Well already

drilled

upon said

rights

property."

[Emphasis added.]
The sentence says, in part, that sellers are to convey
the water rights which have been assigned or are permitted by
law to be diverted from the well.

It is conceded that since

paragraph four of the attachment provides that the Plaintiffs
are to have the exclusive use of the well and two second feet
of water to be diverted therefrom during the life of the contract, it would appear that the parties understood that water
was legally obtainable from the well, as opposed to the quitclaim type of situation wherein the seller only conveys what
right he may possess, if any.

The sentence then proceeds to

identify the water rights:
"...Certificate #
, including
Two (2) second feet of water,..."
Hence, the contract clearly demonstrates that the parties
intended to convey a specific

water right; which is not identi-

fied by number in either paragraph, the space for the identifying number being left blank.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiffs contended at the trial that the reference was
not to a specific water right, however, but to the well drilling
permit under which the well was drilled,

(T\ 20, Lines 5-18).

Yet, it is undisputed that the contract, including the sentence
in question, was drafted by Plaintiffs through their attorney,
Mr. Watson;

(T.92, Lines 1-19; T. 84, Lines 8-10), the Plaintiffs'

attorney indicated

that he had to redraft the attachment so that

it would correctly express his clients1 wishes.

(T. 92, Lines

16-19) :
"MR. WATSON: I prepared that exhibit and I had it
prepared wrong; and on first viewing, we had to prepare it,
and it was changed accordingly."
This Court has previously ruled that when more than one
meaning can be assigned to a term in a contract, that the term
must be interpreted against the party who chose the term. In
the case of Handley

v.

Mutual

L.

Ins.

Co.3

106 Utah 184, 147

P.2d 319, 322, 152, ALR 1278 (1944) this court said:
"It is to be granted that a contract in
case of ambiguity must be construed
against the party who drew it..."
Again, in the decision of Byrant
ing Co.,

v. Deseret

News

Publish-

120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951):
"Plaintiff also invokes the rule of
interpretation that doubtful, ambiguous
terms in a contract should be interpreted
against the party who has chosen the terms,
[citation omitted]. We agree that those
rules of construction should be considered
in determining what is a reasonable and
fair interpretation of the intention of
the parties." c.f. 2 Restatement Contracts,
§ 236(d); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts, § 275.

If Plaintiffs, through their attorney, had intended the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contract to identify a specific well drilling permit, they .
would have denominated the "permit" as such, not as a "certificate18 , the name commonly given to a document identifying
and specifying a water right obtained by a person.

The law

of interpretation of integrated contracts clearly provides that
common usage will be applied first to define a contract's terms,
(2 Restatement Contracts § 230) and Plaintiffs' attorney certainly would have provided for a "well drilling permit" number
if such was desired.

Furthermore, since only one well was

extant at the time, (T. 20, Lines 27-30), no useful purpose
would have been accomplished by referring to that well's permit,
whereas, the parties certainly would have clarified their intent and made it more incisive by referring to the number of
the water certificate which was to be transferred to the well.
As will be seen later, the identity of the particular
water right was, in fact, very important to the Defendant's case,
yet the court would not permit testimony on the subject.
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO LOOK
BEYOND THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE CONTRACT
TO DETERMINE THE PARTIES' INTENT REGARDING THE WATER RIGHT.
During the cross-examination of Albert Castagno, the
purchaser, Defendants attempted to establish that water right
which the contract, but for the blank space, would have identified.

(T. 22, Lines 4-6):

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"QUESTION: Was there any discussion as to where you
were to acquire your additional water right?
ANSWER:

There was.

MR. WATSON: Object, and my objection again goes those
questions are going to parol evidence.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained."
And, again on recross examination, the Plaintiff was prevented from testifying as to the source of the water right to be
conveyed with the well.
" THE COURT:
cussed that?
ANSWER:

(T. 32, Lines 21-27; T. 33, Lines 2-6):

His question, however, is whether you dis-

Oh yeah, We discussed it, you bet.

MR. WATSON: I object to that again, Your Honor, that is
his opinion and Your Honor is going to have to ...
in;

THE COURT: The objection isn't timely and the answer is
I had to prompt him to get the answer.

MR. JEPPESEN: QUESTION. What was the essence of your
conversation regarding the source of the water?
MR. WATSON: Objection, Your Honor, it's going in violation of the parol evidence rule.
THE COURT:

Sustained."

Defendants proffered or solicited testimony on several occasions
as to the identity of the water certificate as being material to
their defense, (T. 22-25; T. 32-33; T. 41-44; T. 86; T. 89-90), in spite
of the fact that the number identifying the water right was left blank,
thereby leaving an open hole in Plaintifffs protestations that there was no

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ambiguity and that Plaintiffs were protected by the parol
evidence rule.
In the case of Mathis

v. Madsen,

1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d

952, 956 (1953) the court quoted the trial court in concluding
that an ill drawn and ambiguous exhibit does not relieve the
court, whether trial court of court of review, of its responsibility,
"...to ascertain its meaning if that can
be done under the provision of law respecting
this type of instrument, [real estate contract]
In searching for meaning, the court must first
examine that language used in the instrument
itself and accord to it the weight and effect
which the instrument itself may show that the
parties intended the words to have. If then
it meaning is still ambiguous or uncertain,
the Court may consider other contemporaneous
writings concerning the same subject matter,
and may, if it is still uncertain, consider
parol evidence of the parties intention."
Defendants were not afforded the opportunity of identifying the water right as Mathis

provides they should have been

allowed to do, and as buttressed by the decision of
Bank and Trust

Co. v. Bybee,

Continental

6 Utah 2d 98, 101, 306 P.2d 773

(1957) .
The refusal to permit this evidence was clearly in
error, to which Defendants took exception.

(T. 42, Line 3).

The error is evident when the doctrine of frustration is considered, especially in light of the testimony with regards to
the manner in which Defendants performance with regards to the
water right was frustrated.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT THREE
THE FACTS INVOKE THE DOCTRINE OF
FRUSTRATION TO EXCUSE THE DEFENDANTS1
PERFORMANCE,,
The general rule of equity is, that when a promisor's
performance is impossible or highly impracticle because of
superceding acts or events

unforseen by the parties when

the contract was executed, the performance of the parties will
be excused, specific performance will not be imposed and the
parties will be restored to their former estate.
Hence, in the case of Perry

v.

Champlain

99 N.H. 541, 114 A.2d 885, 888, the Plaintiff

Oil

Co-3

Inc.,

contracted with

the Defendant that he would open a specific named gas station
on the subject premises.

Through no fault of the Plaintiff's,

he lost the right to represent that specific named company
and his contract performance with the Defendant was therefore
excused under the doctrine of frustration.
Likewise, in Midlothian
225 N.E.2d. 651, 656, cert

v. Bobbins,,

denied.

81 Ill.App.2d 22,

390 U.S. 948 (1967), the

Plaintiff contracted to buy water from Defendant.

It was sub-

sequently determined that Defendant's supply was totally inadequate for Plaintiff's needs, and Plaintiff was excused from
purchasing water from Defendant.
A brief review of the facts of this case relating to
the one second foot of water Defendants agreed to supply

-10-
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demonstrates that in spite of the transfer of the water to
the subject well, Defendants have been frustrated in their
performance, because the right to use that water has yet to
be decided by the State Engineer's Office.
During redirect examination, Mr. Rex Lawson, area
engineer for the Grantsville area of Tooele Valley, wherein
the well and real property herein lies, (T. 35, Ex.l-P) testified under questioning by Mr. Watson that the Defendant, Melvin
Church, had applied for the transfer of a second foot of water
to the subject well from a water right known as the "Buzianis
right", which change application was denied because the
"Buzianis right" was for water located in a water shed or
district other than the one where subject well was located.
Subsequently, Mr, Church filed another change application
known as the "Castagno right" or "Bernard Castagno right".
(T. 48, Lines 3-19 & T. 54, Lines 9-20, 27-30) :
"MR. WATSON: QUESTION. Mr. Larson, calling your attention to your testimony about Mr. Church filing application
No. A-7783 (151881) that was an application to divert one
second foot of water onto the subject property and that is
covered by the contract? are you aware now of that application?
ANSWER:

Yes, from the document you have just showed me.

QUESTION: The documents are you then advised by memory
or after refreshing do you recall that there was [sic] two
applications made by Mr. Church?
ANSWER:

Apparently there was, yes.

QUESTION: One from Louis Buzianis, an application that
was in the Tooele area, is that right?
about —

ANSWER:
—

Yes.

That's right.

-11-

I thought you were talking
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QUESTION: And then there was another application by
Mr. Church to divert a source of water from other sources,
is that correct?
ANSWER:

Apparently that is.

THE COURT: So that I'll have this matter in mind
properly as to what your testimony is; may I just briefly
summarize what I believe you have told me and see if you agree?
ANSWER:

All right.

QUESTION: Mr. Larson, As I understand your testimony,
the so-called first application for change was the one that
has been called the Buzianis matter?
ANSWER:

Correct.

QUESTION: And that one was heard and denied by reason
of the fact that you had to change district and policy of the
district could not be changed?
ANSWER:

That is correct.

QUESTION: Now, regarding the so-called second application; is that the one that might be called maybe the Castagno
application?
ANSWER: Yes."
Mr. Church subsequently testified on direct examination
that the second application was filed some four months prior
to the execution of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract.
(T. 88, Lines 14-17, T.90, Lines 80-16):

'

"QUESTION: Now, are you speaking of what Mr. Larson
referred to as the second assignment No. A-7783, or the Bernard
Castagno assignment?

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ANSWER: Yes,
QUESTION:
ANSWER:

And when did you acquire the water right?

Oh, prior to the signing of that agreement,

QUESTION: What is the date?
ANSWER: The 20th of August, 1973, was when this
assignment was signed."
The Bernard Castagno right was acquired by the Defendants
from the Plaintiffs3

for the purpose of providing a water right

that could be diverted from the well.

(T. 90, Lines 30; T. 91,

Lines 1-12):
"Mr. Jeppesen: Strike that. Would you tell us the procedure you followed in acquiring the water right which you intened or intend to convey pursuant to the contract?
ANSWER: Procedure was filing the necessary documents
that establish the chain of the title from Albert's father
to his mother, and his mother to him; and from him to me. Now
along with a segregation application for the seperate one second
foot and transfer it onto the property that was sold, that was
established.
QUESTION:

You have segregated one second foot and filed

that?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION:

And that is, in fact, the A-7783 application?

ANSWER: Yes."
The Bernard Castagno right was brought to the parties'
attention by Mr. Rex larson, the area engineer.
25-30; Te 41, Lines 1-4):

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(T. 40, Lines

"QUESTION: All right. I assume this is the so-called
Buzianis right and after that right was denied, do you recall
having a conversation in your office with Mr. Church with regard to possible other sources of water that could be transferred to the Plaintiff's land?
ANSWER:

Yes, I do.

QUESTION: And did you mention to him a five second
right that was in the estate of Bernard Castagno?
ANSWER: I mentioned this particular right that had
been filed on by Bernard CAstagno, yes."
Mr. Larson discussed the right with both of the parties
on numerous occasions.

(T. 44, Lines 6-12):

"QUESTION: Have you had any conversation with either
of the parties in this matter concerning the acquisition of
a water right, or a permit to drill a well and divert water
to that well on this property?
ANSWER:

Yes, on numerous occasions.

QUESTION:
parties?

In fact, you had conversations with both

ANSWER: Yes."
The change application segregating the Defendants1 one
second foot of water and changing its point of diversion to
the subject well was, however, protested by Myron Castagno and
the Federal Land Bank.

(T. 37, Lines 9-17; Ex. P-15, P-16).

On the date the hearing on the protest was scheduled to be held,
the Defendant/ Melvin Church/ came to the Courthouse to attend
the hearing.

(T. 97, Lines 16-20).

"MR. JEPPESEN: QUESTION. Let me ask you this; did
you, in fact/ go to the hearing assembly itself?
-14-
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ANSWER: No*
QUESTIONS
ANSWER^

Why not?
Because the phone call was made.

MR. WATSON:

Your Honor, I object«

THE WITNESS: The hearing was canceled by Mr. Watson.

THE COURT: The record of any response that was made to
that question is now stricken and I'll let you answer that
question, why didn't you go to the hearing?
ANSWER:

I was advised that

THE COURT: By whom?
ANSWER:

By Eddie Watson."

According to Mr. Church, (T. 99, Lines 21-23) and Mr.
Rex Larson, the hearing had not been rescheduled and held as
of the date of the trial.

(T. 58, Lines 14-16).

As a conse-

quence, Mr. Larson had to require the Plaintiffs to discontinue
using the water from the well.

(T. 38, Lines 14-18).

Mr. Larson also indicated the perdicament in which the
Defendants were placed by this turn of events, there being no
other water available for diversion from the subject well. (T. 40,
& 47, Lines 1-4):
"MR. WATSON: QUESTION. One question, Mr. Larson, is
it possible to get a water right to this piece of property now,
the property in question?
ANSWER: The area is closed to new appropriations of
water in excess of that required for domestic purposes of one
family.

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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QUESTION:

Excuse me,

ANSWER: However, if the applicant could obtain a
water right by purchase or transfer from one who has an
approved right, change application could be filed as long
as that right is in the Grantsville area and it could transferred by change application to this location.
QUESTION: And at the present time, Mr. Larson, to
your personal knowledge, are there presently permitted wells
which have not been drilled in the Grantsville area that could
possibly be purchased and transferred to this?
ANSWER: I am not aware of any approved applications
that have not been drilled. We have numerous applications
that have been filed and not yet approved.
QUESTION: And if those were disapproved, then would that
open up possibility of water to be obtained?
ANSWER:

Not necessarily.

QUESTION: Are there, in your mind and with your knowledge, purchasable rights in the Grantsville area if the person
would sell?
ANSWER:

I am not aware of any that are for sale, no.

QUESTION:
ANSWER:

But there are those that could be transferred?

If they could acquire the right, yes.

QUESTION: Or induce the owner of the right to transfer,
is that what you mean?
ANSWER:

Yeah."

Hence, Defendants are without a present means of supplying one second foot of water to the well, and will be until
the hearing is scheduled and held pursuant to the notice of
the State Engineer's Office.

As Mr. Larson also indicated, the

hearing will be set, not upon notice or request of one of the
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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parties, but when it comes up again automatically for hearing
as set by the department,

(T, 61, Lines 7-12):

"QUESTION: If one particular party asked for a continuance, would you require that party to request the matter be
reset for hearing or would you automatically reset it for
hearing?
ANSWER: It would be automatically reset to the next
time when we scheduled hearings in the area,"
Consequently, through no fault of the Defendants, the
application for water which the parties intended to be used
from the subject property is unavailable for use at the time
Plaintiffs demand performance, which, it should be noted, is
some six years prior to the expected date of full payment by
the seller, (Ex. 1-P), since the purchase was to have been
paid in annual installments of $2,500 each, and the water right
and well was to be conveyed only upon final payment. Wherefore,
the doctrine of frustration should be applied to aid defendants
herein.
The doctrine is probably best expressed in the opinion
of the Idaho Supreme Court in Twin

Harbors

Lumber

Co. v.

Carrico*

92 Idaho 343, 442 P.2d 753, 758-759 (1968):
"The doctrine of impossibility excusing
performance of a contractual obligation,
insofar as relavent in the present setting,
provides generally that if by express terms
of a bargain or within the contemplation of
the bargaining parties the existence of a
specific thing is essentially necessary for
the performance of a promise in the bargain,
a duty to perform the promise...is discharged
if the thing...subsequently is not in existence in time of seasonable performance.M
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Parsons v. Bristol
Vev. Co., 62 Cal.2d 861,
44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839 (1965); c.f.
Cannon v. Huhndorf, 67 Wash.2d 778, 409 P.2d
865 (1966); United States
v. Buffalo
Coal
Mining Company, 345 F.2d 517, (on denial of
petition for rehearing) (9th Cir. 1965);
Foster v. Atlantic
Refingin
Co,, 329 F.2d
485 (5th Cir. 1964); See gen. Annot. Modern
Status of Rules Regarding Impossibility of
Performance as Defense in Action for Breach
of Contract. 84 A.L.R.2d 12, §19, pp 92-102
(1962); 6 Corbin, Contracts &1339 (1962);
6 Williston, Contracts && 1948 and 1952-1953
(rev. ed. 1938); Simpson, Contracts & 182
(2nd Ed. [Hornbook] 1965)."

The case of West Los Angeles
search

v.

Meyer,

Institute

366 F.2d 220, 225, cert,

for
denied

Cancer

Re-

385 U.S. 1010

(C.A. 9th Cir. 1966) further gives support to the right of the
Defendants to be excused performance here.

Therein, stockholders

agreedfcycontract to sell their tax exempt institute and to
enter into a lease-back agreement for the use of the facilities
of the institute.

Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service

declared the arrangement invalid for capitol gains tax purposes,
which the stockholders showed at trial to be the purpose of
the arrangement.

The court held that "commercial frustration"

or supervening impossibility of performance applied, and the
stockholders were relieved of transacting the sale.
As was shown by the testimony of Mr. Rex Larson, production of some other

water right in this instance is highly un-

likely as Mr. Larson, the supervising engineer knows of none
for sale and indicated that the area was closed to new appropriations for any purpose but single family culinary use. (T.
46-47

supra).
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The fact that the Defendants might be able to acquire
another right if they were to come up with whatever exceedingly
unreasonable price, the seller might wish does not take the
Defendants8 performance out of the doctrine of frustration,
as the doctrine of frustration is invoked whenever the performance of the promisor is highly impractable or unreasonably
Kansas,

difficult.
Co.,

Oklahoma

& Gulf

434 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1967);

Ass'n.,

519 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1974);

of Jewish

Women v. Sisters

Co. v.

Northern

518 P.2d 22 (1972); Cherokee

Springs,

R.

of Charity

Grand

Corp.

Water
Portland

v.

Diet.

Lake

Grain

Chugach
v.

Colorado

Section

of Providence

Elec.

of

in

Council

Oregon,

266 Or.448, 513 P.2d 1183 (1973).

: r

CONCLUSION

The trial court was correct in all of its findings of
fact and in the conclusions of law, as far as the same considered the Plaintiff1 legal or equitable remedies. Nevertheless,
the court erred in failing to invoke the doctrine of frustration
so as to excuse Defendants' performance when the failure thereof
was entirely unforseen by the parties and beyond their power
to prevent.

Had the court permitted testimony as to the parties

identification of the source of water to be diverted from the
well, that plus the testimony of Mr. Larson that no other water
was available for diversion from the well, would have called for
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the application of the doctrine of frustration and excused the
Defendants1 performance if not altogether, at least for sufficient time for the cloud on the water right in question to be
cleared.
WHEREFORE, Defendants Church, respectfully pray that
the trial court's judgment against them be reversed, and that
failing, that they be granted a new trial

Dated this

lj

day of March, 1976.

Respectfully submitted,

/^^^^LL,
Alan K. ^eppl^aen
Tooele/6ity k ) | l
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